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Abstract
We compare three approaches to linking representative-household
macro models with micro household income data in terms of their im-
plications for measuring the poverty and distributional eﬀects of policy
shocks. These approaches are a simple micro-accounting method, an
extension of that method to account for changes in employment struc-
ture, and the Beta distribution approach. Even though in our simu-
lation exercises the three methods do not lead to fundamentally dif-
ferent results in absolute terms, we show that potential diﬀerences in
the measurement of distributional and poverty eﬀects of policy shocks
can be very large.
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21 Introduction
In recent years renewed eﬀorts have been made (at the World Bank and
elsewhere) to develop new policy tools aimed at better understanding the
channels through which adjustment policies aﬀect the poor and the pos-
sible trade-oﬀs that poverty reduction strategies may entail regarding the
sequencing of policy reforms. One approach consists in using disaggregated
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that integrate several repre-
sentative household groups (RHG). These models try to capture a variety
of channels through which stabilization policies and structural reforms aﬀect
growth, income inequality, and poverty.
A case in point is the Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analy-
sis (IMMPA) model developed by Agénor (2003), Agénor, Izquierdo and
Fofack (2003), and Agénor, Fernandes and Haddad (2003). IMMPA mod-
els are typically based on a parsimonious ﬁve-good structure (rural, urban
informal, urban private formal, urban public formal, and imported goods)
and distinguish between a fairly small number of representative households.
For instance, in Mini-IMMPA there are only ﬁve categories of households,
consisting of workers in the rural sector, workers in the urban informal econ-
omy, urban unskilled workers in the formal sector, urban skilled workers in
the formal sector, and capitalists-rentiers (see Agénor (2003)). Data from a
household survey are classiﬁed into the categories of households contained
in the structural component of the model. Following a policy or exogenous
shock, real growth rates in per capita consumption and disposable income for
all categories of households are obtained from the structural model, up to the
end of the simulation horizon. These growth rates are applied separately to
(disposable) income and consumption expenditure for each household in the
survey, giving therefore a new vector of absolute income and consumption
levels for each individual in each category or group of households. Poverty
and income distribution indicators are then calculated with these new data,
after updating the initial poverty lines (using the price indexes generated by
the structural component of the model), to reﬂect changes in the price of
the consumption basket and purchasing power of income. Because changes
in within-group distribution are ignored, these indicators reﬂect essentially
changes across groups.
While appealing from a practical point of view, this approach is open to
the criticism that it does not account for heterogeneity among agents within
groups and introduces only in a partial manner the relevant changes that
3occur at the macro level as a result of shocks (most importantly, changes
in employment) to the micro component of the analysis. More generally,
the assumption that within-group rank ordering of households and individu-
als are unchanged and unaﬀected by policy shocks implies that workers are
withdrawn from the sector of origin in a representative manner (leaving the
distribution of income there unchanged) and that, as they move from one
sector to another, they assume the income distribution characteristics of the
sector of destination (in particular, the variance of income in that sector is
assumed to apply to all new entrants).1 T h u s ,s o m ew o r k e r sm a yb ep o o r
not because of their personal characteristics, but rather because of the eco-
nomic circumstances that characterize their sector of employment. At the
same time, however, the nature of the practical gains entailed by dropping
the assumption of a stable within-group distribution and accounting fully for
heterogeneity at the micro level remain a matter of debate. In a context where
skills and resources are limited, it is thus important to compare alternative
approaches, using standard poverty and income distribution measures.
This paper contributes to this debate by comparing three approaches
aimed at linking macro and micro levels to analyze the poverty and distrib-
utional eﬀects of policy and exogenous shocks in applied general equilibrium
models. The ﬁr s ta p p r o a c hi st h eo n ef o l l o w e di nm o s to ft h eI M M P Aa p p l i c a -
tions described earlier, and consists of introducing group-speciﬁc changes in
income and consumption in a household income survey and computing post-
shock poverty and distributional indicators on the basis of the “adjusted”
household data. The second approach extends the ﬁrst in the sense that it
not only incorporates changes in income and consumption occurring at the
macro level in the household survey, but it also accounts for changes in the
employment structure predicted by the macro component. This is done by
modifying the weight given to each household in the survey. The third ap-
proach, which was pioneered by Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Dervis,
de Melo and Robinson (1982), and more recently by Decaluwé, Dumont and
Savard (1999), and Decaluwé, Patry, Savard, and Thorbecke (1999), imposes
a ﬁxed, parametrically estimated distribution of income within each group
and assumes that shocks shift the mean of these distributions without, how-
ever, modifying their shape. Poverty indicators are then computed based
1It also implies that income transfers between households in any given group are ig-
nored. In practice, intra-group income reallocation may be large in periods of hardship
and may represent an important factor in understanding the poverty eﬀects of adverse
economic shocks.
4on these distributions. To illustrate and compare these three approaches
we use the Mini-IMMPA framework developed by Agénor (2003). In con-
trast to the original IMMPA framework, Mini-IMMPA focuses only on the
“real” side of the economy and provides an even more detailed treatment of
the labor market–an important feature for comparing the ﬁrst and second
approaches described earlier. We use a calibrated prototype version for a
“typical” middle-income developing country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief discussion of the standard ‘Representative Household Groups’ (RHG)
framework. Section 3 presents the three alternative approaches to micro-
macro linkages that we compare. Section 4 outlines the structure of Mini-
IMMPA, the RHG framework that we use for our comparisons. Section 5
presents the simulation results of various policy-induced shocks on income
distribution and poverty and uses them to compare the three approaches
presented in section 3. The last section summarizes our main results and
suggests further extensions of our analysis.
2 Macro-RHG Models and Poverty Analysis
Most macroeconomic models that have been recently developed to quantify
poverty reduction strategies distinguish several broad categories of agents
such as households, ﬁrms, the government, sometimes the central bank and
commercial banks, and the rest of the world. On the production side, there
is often a distinction between the rural and urban sectors. Within the rural
sector, the tradable and nontradable goods sectors may be distinguished.
The urban sector is often viewed as consisting of an informal sector, a formal
private sector, and a formal public sector. Households are generally dis-
aggregated in several so-called “representative household groups” or RHGs,
according to their education level (skilled and unskilled), their location (rural
and urban), and their sector of employment. By distinguishing between rural
and urban sectors and by accounting for migration dynamics, some models
also allow the user to study separately the evolution of poverty in urban and
rural areas and its relation with output and employment ﬂuctuations across
sectors.
In this type of model, referred to as “Macro-RHG models” in what follows,
the distributional and poverty eﬀects of shocks (exogenous or policy induced)
are generally based on the association between group-speciﬁc mean incomes
5and the state of poverty. For instance, if the mean income of workers in the
rural tradable goods sector is below the poverty line, all workers in this sector
are considered poor. Likewise, inequality indicators in this framework are
based only on the distance between group-speciﬁc means. Therefore, within-
group heterogeneity (that is, dispersion around group means) is completely
ignored.
However, a common observation is that the contribution of within-group
income inequality to overall income inequality is much more important than
that of between-group inequality, even if households are disaggregated in rel-
atively small groups and part of the intra-group inequality can be attributed
to measurement errors and idiosyncratic, transitory elements of income. If,
for instance, Ivorian households are classiﬁed in 10 groups according to sector
of activity and educational attainment of the household head, more than 80
percent of the variance of household income per capita is within groups. Like-
wise, in the case of Indonesia a similar classiﬁcation in 10 groups leaves 74
percent of the total variance unexplained. Or, if we separate Malagasy house-
h o l d si n1 4e v e ng r o u p s ,w es t i l lﬁnd 76 percent of the total variance within
groups.2 Furthermore, inequality changes w i t h i ng r o u p sm a yb ea tl e a s ta s
important as changes between groups. Because, by deﬁnition, Macro-RHG
models do not account for intra-group heterogeneity, they cannot provide
much insight in the analysis of the impact of government policy or exoge-
nous shocks on income distribution.
3 Linking Income Survey Data with Macro-
RHG Models
In what follows we present three approaches to linking Macro-RHG models
with information from a Household Income Survey, such as an Integrated
Survey (IS) or Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS). The ﬁrst two
approaches are so-called ‘micro-accounting’ approaches. This term refers to
a special kind of micro-simulation models that work directly with all the
observations gathered in a household survey, but do not take explicitly into
account the behavior of agents at the micro level. Under the third approach,
the Macro-RHG model supplies the household module with group-speciﬁc
2These estimates are derived from computations by the authors, based on household
surveys of the respective countries.
6changes in mean income. The household survey provides additional infor-
mation on income dispersion in each group, which is assumed ﬁxed across
diﬀerent simulations.
3.1 A Simple Micro-Accounting Method
Macro-RHG models can be relatively easily connected with a household in-
come survey to compute poverty and inequality indicators over a sample of
actual households and not only over group-speciﬁcm e a n sa si nt h es t a n d a r d
Macro-RHG framework. The advantage of this method is that now a uni-
form intra-group distribution is not assumed but instead use is made of the
distribution observed for the sample of actual households. In general this
method follows ﬁve steps:3
1. Classify the available sample into the categories of households distin-
guished by the macro model (using information on the main source of
income of the household head, for instance).
2. Retain from the macro model nominal growth rates in per capita con-
sumption or disposable income induced by a shock for all categories of
households.
3. Apply these growth rates separately to the per capita disposable in-
come or consumption expenditure of each household in the household
survey. This provides absolute income or consumption expenditure
levels following the shock.
4. Adjust poverty lines (expressed in monetary units) using changes in
consumer prices given by the macro model (possibly separately for the
rural and urban sectors, or even separately for each household group).
Then, using the new absolute nominal levels of income and consumption
for each group, calculate standard income distribution measures such
as the headcount index, the poverty gap, and the Gini coeﬃcient.
5. Compare the post-shock poverty and income distribution indicators
with the baseline values to assess the impact of the shock on the poor.
3See on this approach the detailed description in Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003).
A similar method is followed by Löfgren, Robinson and El-Said (2002), and Coady and
Harris (2001).
7To measure poverty we use the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke’s (FGT)











where α is a poverty-aversion parameter, N the total number of households
in the survey, yit household i’s income or consumption in period t,a n dzt
the poverty line in period t. α =0yields the headcount ratio, that is, the
percentage of poor households. α =1yields the poverty gap index, that is,
t h ea v e r a g ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e ni n c o m ea n dt h ep o v e r t yl i n e( w h e r ef o rn o n -
poor households this distance is set to zero) as a fraction of the poverty line.
These measures can be calculated for each household category j,a sw e l la s
for the total population.
To measure inequality we use the Gini coeﬃcient and the Theil index.4
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where households are ranked in ascending order of yit and ¯ yt is mean house-
hold income or consumption in period t.













Figure 1 summarizes the whole procedure, where each step is represented
by a box. This approach to micro-macro linkage is “top-down” as there are
no feedback eﬀects from the household survey to the Macro-RHG model, i.e.
market equilibria are entirely simulated on the macro-side without accounting
for any further heterogeneity in behavior within groups.
This method is not entirely satisfactory to the extent that per capita
consumption and income in the household sample are adjusted to the cor-
responding levels in the macro model, but the employment structure is not.
4For details on these indicators, see for instance Cowell (1999). Whereas the Gini
coeﬃcient is most sensitive to income diﬀerences around the middle (or, more precisely,
the mode) of the distribution, the Theil index is most sensitive to income diﬀerences at
the top of the distribution.
8This implies that labor market mobility aﬀects poverty and income distrib-
ution only through relative income changes induced by, among other things,
changes in the employment structure at the macro level. When the changes
are transmitted to the household survey, it is thus assumed that each in-
dividual remains in his or her initial activity. If the Macro-RHG model is
dynamic, the same problem arises for other dimensions of the population
structure; the urban-rural distribution and the age structure may change in
the macro component, but these changes are not taken into account when the
link with the household survey is established. Furthermore, as noted earlier,
the application of group-speciﬁc, instead of household-speciﬁc, real growth
rates of consumption or income assumes that the intra-group distribution of
consumption and disposable income remains constant after a shock.
To set up the procedure described above, we use instead of an actual
household income and expenditure survey a “ﬁctitious” one that we built as
follows. First, we produced a sample of 5,000 observations, where the share
of each household category (ﬁve in our case, see below) corresponds exactly
to that in our macro model.5 We considered each observation to represent
one household. Second, using a random number generator and a log-normal
distribution, we drew values for disposable income and consumption expendi-
ture for each household. We imposed as parameters for each group the initial
values for average disposable income and average consumption expenditure
(as speciﬁed for the numerical solution of the macro model) as mean and
standard deviation, except for skilled workers in the formal urban sector and
for capitalists and rentiers, for which we imposed a standard deviation equal
to 0.8 times the mean.6 Third, we set (somewhat arbitrarily) the income
poverty line for the rural sector such that the percentage of poor house-
holds in the rural sector is 50 percent. We then assumed the poverty line
in urban areas to be 15 percent higher. Rural and urban poverty lines for
consumption expenditure were calculated in the same way. This procedure
produced an economy-wide income-based headcount index of 38.6 percent
and an economy-wide consumption-based headcount index of 41.1 percent.
5More speciﬁcally, the shares are 28.1 percent workers in the agricultural sector (rural),
45.3 percent workers in the informal urban sector, 13.7 percent unskilled workers in the
formal urban sector, 9.9 percent skilled workers in the formal urban sector, and 3.0 percent
capitalists and rentiers.
6This is done to limit the number of skilled workers in the formal urban sector and
capitalists and rentiers who have less income and consumption expenditure than workers
in the informal urban sector or unskilled workers in the formal urban sector.
9For simplicity, we assumed that poverty lines remain constant in real terms
for the whole horizon of the simulation period.
3.2 An Extension with Reweighting Techniques
Adding changes in the employment structure to the household survey, we
combine now the micro-accounting method described above with reweighting
techniques.7 The employment variable accounts in our illustrative example
for three dimensions of the population structure: residence (rural or urban),
sector of employment (agriculture, informal, or formal), and educational at-
tainment (skilled or unskilled). It is intuitively clear that large changes in
the employment structure may have strong eﬀects on income distribution.
Whereas in the ﬁrst approach we have to assume that (the sum of) within-
group inequality remains constant over time, in this approach it will change
to the extent that population and income shares of each group change over
time.
In our approach reweighting is done through special statistical proce-
dures that alter the distribution of desired characteristics Xi (the linkage
variables) of the population by adjusting the weight attached to each of the
N households indexed with i.8 In general, the problem is to ﬁnd an n-vector
w0 of adjustment factors optimizing an objective function Z(w0,w)–a func-
tion evaluating the distance between the new adjustment factors w0
i to be
c o m p u t e d ,a n dt h ea v a i l a b l ef a c t o r swi–satisfying a certain number m of





(n) = r(m). (5)
This adjustment problem is a simultaneous one, where for even a quite
large number of characteristics just one single weighting factor has to be
computed for each household, which after summing up fulﬁlls consistently
all hierarchical restrictions simultaneously (see Merz (1994)). These statis-
tical procedures preserve the joint distribution of the other characteristics.
Put diﬀerently, instead of estimating econometric models to run simulations,
reweighting (or “static ageing”) takes macro aggregates and then adjusts the
7The method that we describe can of course be extended to account for other changes
in the population structure as well; see Allie and Murphy (2000).
8On reweighting techniques in general, see for instance Landt et al. (1994).
10underlying distribution to produce projections of the population distribution
over time (or before and after a shock). The underlying characteristics are
held constant, while the weights given to diﬀe r e n tp a r t so ft h es a m p l ea r e
changed. It is important to note, however, that reweighting assumes that
the characteristics within a weighted group do not change over time. There-
fore, if large changes occur in a variable that was not included in the macro
weights, errors might arise. For instance, a weighting scheme where weights
are applied according to whether a family has children or not would overesti-
mate the number of children if the fertility rate fell as a result of a reduction
in the number of large families rather than a smaller number of families with
children.
Given that at this stage we want to reweight only with respect to changes
in the employment structure without imposing any additional constraints, the
procedure is relatively straightforward, because we have only one condition
in the minimization problem. The procedure is summarized in Figure 2. We
use the same artiﬁcial household survey as in the ﬁrst approach. In a real
country case the procedure may be extended to account for other changes in
the population structure as well, coming either directly from the Macro-RHG
model (as for instance the population growth rate) or taken from external
sources such as the United Nations’ demographic projections. Appendix A
points out some of these issues and shows also how reweighting procedures
could be used to achieve consistency between a Macro-RHG model and real
household survey data in the base year.
Under the reweighting procedure, we calculate the household group-speciﬁc
FGT poverty measures as before, but when calculating it for the urban pop-
ulation and the total population we now account for changes in the employ-







where the index j stands for the household categories and wjt for their re-
spective share in the total population in period t. In the micro-accounting
method presented earlier, the implicit assumption was that the coeﬃcients
wjt remain constant over time.
Likewise, we can calculate the inequality measures by weighing each
h o u s e h o l dw i t hi t sg r o u pa n dp e r i o d - s p e c i ﬁcw e i g h tfjt,w h e r efjt = wjt/Nj
with wjt is the share of group j in the population at period t and Nj the size
11of group j in the initial period. In period t =0 , fj0 is thus equal to 1/N for
each household.
3.3 The Use of Distribution Functions
3.3.1 Methodology
The third approach uses speciﬁc parametric distributions to describe the dis-
persion of income within each group. The parameters of these distributions
are generally estimated using real household survey data. We use again our
ﬁctitious sample of household incomes and consumption expenditure. In
contrast to the two approaches presented above, once the parameters are es-
timated, the survey data are not used anymore to evaluate the distributional
eﬀects of shocks. Following a shock, the ﬁtted distributions are only shifted
according to the changes of the group-speciﬁc mean incomes; to the right
(increase in income or consumption) or to the left (decrease in income or
consumption) without modifying the shape of the distributions. The poverty
indicators are also computed using the estimated shape parameters, without
once again relying on the survey data. The overall distribution of income
is generated empirically by summing the separate within-group distributions
and is then used to generate overall measures of poverty and inequality.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a ti nt h i sa p p r o a c ha n di nt h et w of o r m e r
approaches changes in income are not distributed in the same way within
groups. Whereas in the ﬁr s tt w o ,w es u p p o s eu s u a l l yt h a tt h erelative in-
crease is uniform over the whole distribution (that is, the absolute change is
proportional to the initial income), in the distribution function approach the
absolute increase is assumed to be uniform over the whole distribution (that
is, the relative increase is the higher the lower the initial income). Neverthe-
less, with the distribution function approach we also assume that intra-group
inequality remains unaﬀected by a shock to income or consumption levels,
as in the other two approaches.
As in Decaluwé, Patry, Savard and Thorbecke (1999) and Decaluwé, Du-
mont and Savard (1999), we use Beta distribution functions to describe the
within-group distributions. Of course, it would be more logical to use the
log-normal distributions from which our data is drawn, but in a real country
case the assumption of Beta distributions may be more convenient, because
o ft h e i rh i g h e rd e g r e eo fﬂexibility.9
9Boccanfuso, Decaluwé and Savard (2002) compared six alternative functional forms to
12The Beta density distribution is a continuous function taking values be-














The parameters β1 and β2 are positive. To normalize a given variable,





where mn and mx are the minimum and maximum values, respectively, of
the distribution of yi.
The parameters β1 and β2 have the following moments estimators:11
ˆ β1 =¯ x
µ
¯ x(1 − ¯ x)
s2 − 1
¶
, ˆ β2 =( 1− ¯ x)
µ




where ¯ x stands for the sample mean and s2 represents the sample variance.
The FGT poverty measures expressed in terms of the Beta density dis-











I(x; ˆ β1jˆ β2j)dx, (11)
where z0
tj is the group and period-speciﬁc normalized poverty line, deﬁned as
z0
tj =( ztj − mnj)/(mxj − mnj). Thus, equation (11) allows us to compare
model within-group distributions. They concluded that no single form is more appropriate
in all cases or groups of households. However, the authors advocate, especially when
detailed disaggregation is required, rather ﬂexible forms as the Beta function, which allows,
for instance, distributions to be very negatively skewed.
10See the description in “A thesaurus of Mathematics”, University of Cambridge, at
http://www.thesaurus.maths.org.
11See the internet website “Scientiﬁc Resources: Statistics—Econometrics—Forecasting”,
at http://www.xycoon.com/index.htm. Alternatively, one can estimate the parameters
with Maximum Likelihood techniques.
13the poverty levels obtained in the post-simulation case with those prevailing
in the pre-simulation case. To calculate the poverty measures for the urban
or the total population at t, we can either weigh the group-speciﬁcp o v e r t y
measures of equation (11) by their initial population shares, wj0,o rb yt h e i r
population shares at t, wjt,a si ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) .
Given that the household survey data are discarded once the shape pa-
rameters are estimated, and given that the distribution function approach
assumes implicitly that intra-group inequality does not change following a
shock, we limit now the measurement of inequality to between-group in-
equality. The Theil index allows an exact decomposition of total inequality
between within- and between-group inequality.12 Between-group inequality,









Therefore between-group inequality depends only on sjt, the share of total
income held by group j, ¯ yjt, the mean income in group j,a n d¯ yt,t h eo v e r a l l
mean of income. Of course, to estimate changes in overall inequality, one may
measure intra-group inequality with the survey that is used to estimate the
shape parameters in the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,a n dt h e na d dt h i sm e a s u r ei ne a c hp e r i o d
to between-group inequality. Figure 3 summarizes the simulation procedure
when using the Beta distribution method.
3.3.2 Estimation Results and Goodness of Fit
Table A1 in Appendix B presents the estimated shape parameters of the
Beta density distribution function for both disposable income and consump-
tion expenditure, using our ﬁctitious household survey. Initial experiments
indicated that the estimation results were very sensitive to outliers. To in-
crease the goodness of ﬁt of our estimates, we eliminated for each group the
ﬁve highest and ﬁve lowest values of the distribution. Table A2 in Appendix
B compares the “observed” values for the poverty measures P0 and P1 for in-
come and consumption with the predicted values using both sets of estimated
shape parameters, that is, with and without dropping the extreme values (as
deﬁned above). Figures A1 and A2 show the corresponding “observed” and
“ﬁtted” (after dropping extreme values) cumulative distribution functions.
12See for instance Shorrocks (1984), Deaton (1997), and Cowell (1999).
14From Table A2 it can be seen that if we correct the data for outliers the
ﬁti sq u i t ea c c e p t a b l ef o rP0–at least for households in the rural sector and
households in the informal urban sector. However, for the other three groups,
the deviations are signiﬁcant. One explanation for this outcome is that the
population size is smaller for these groups, and thus the estimated shape
parameters are less reliable. The poverty gap ratio is much more diﬃcult
to ﬁt. Here the predicted indicators lie more than 40 percent above the
observed values. It is interesting to see that in our case the predictions of
the Beta distributions lead always to an overestimation of P0 and P1 (except
for capitalists and rentiers), compared to the indicators that are directly
measured from the survey data. Figures A1 and A2 show that the quality of
the prediction depends also strongly on where the poverty line is drawn. The
ﬁtted curve crosses the observed curve for the ﬁrst time around a cumulated
population of 40 to 50 percent. If the poverty line is close to this intersection,
than the prediction of P1 w o u l db eo fc o u r s eq u i t eg o o d .
4 The Macro-RHG Framework
Mini-IMMPA is a simpliﬁed version of the Integrated Macroeconomic Model
for Poverty Analysis developed by Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003), and
Agénor, Fernandes, and Haddad (2003). Although Mini-IMMPA focuses only
on the “real” side, it oﬀers a more detailed treatment of the labor market,
accounting for features such as employment subsidies and job security provi-
sions. Given its focus on the real side, the building blocks of the “structural”
component of Mini-IMMPA consist of the production side, employment, the
demand side, external trade, sectoral and aggregate prices, income forma-
tion, consumption and savings, private investment, and the public sector.
As noted earlier, households are deﬁned according to the skills composition
of the workforce and the sector of employment. There is one rural household,
comprising all workers employed in the rural sector. In the urban sector there
are two types of unskilled households, those working in the informal sector
and those employed in the formal sector. The fourth type of households
consists of skilled workers employed in the formal urban economy (in both
the private and public sectors). Finally, there are capitalists-rentiers whose
income comes from ﬁrms’ earnings in the urban private sector. The following
description of the model is kept quite short; for a more detailed presentation
the reader is referred to Agénor (2003, 2004).
154.1 Production and the Labor Market
The basic distinction on the production side is that between rural and urban
sectors. In the rural economy ﬁrms produce one good, which is sold domesti-
cally or exported. The urban economy consists of both formal and informal
components. The informal economy produces nontraded services. The for-
mal urban economy is separated between production of a private good, and
a nontraded public good.
For all activities the production technology is represented by value added
functions and ﬁxed (Leontief) intermediate input coeﬃcients. With excep-
tion of the public sector, the value added functions are represented by sets of
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions and Cobb-Douglas
(CD) functions. The rural sector uses land (assumed to be in ﬁxed supply),
unskilled labor, and the economy-wide stock of public physical capital. Pro-
duction exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to the two latter
inputs. Value added in the informal sector requires only unskilled labor and
is subject to decreasing returns to scale. Urban private formal production
uses as inputs both skilled and unskilled labor, as well as private and public
physical capital. Skilled labor and private physical capital are assumed to
have a higher degree of complementarity than private physical capital and
unskilled labor. Furthermore, it is assumed that public capital is subject
to congestion eﬀects, that is, the positive externality associated with public
capital decreases as its usage by the urban population increases. Value added
in the public sector is measured from the government wage bill. Employment
levels of skilled and unskilled workers in that sector are treated as predeter-
mined variables. Firms in the rural and the private formal sector allocate
their output to exports or the domestic market according to a production
possibility frontier, deﬁned by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
function. Assuming imperfect substitutability, the ratio between exports and
domestic sales depends on the relative prices of exported and domestic goods
and the elasticity of substitution between these goods.
The demand for labor in the rural sector is derived from ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for proﬁt maximization. Labor demand is related positively to the level
of net output and negatively to the product wage (the nominal wage deﬂated
by the net output price). The nominal wage in the rural sector adjusts to
clear the labor market. The supply of labor in the rural sector is prede-
termined at any given point in time, but grows over time at the exogenous
population growth rate net of worker migration to urban areas. Following
16Harris and Todaro (1970), the incentives to migrate are taken to depend neg-
atively on the ratio of the average expected wage in rural areas relative to
the wage prevailing in urban areas. Unskilled workers in the urban economy
may be employed either in the private formal sector, in which case they are
paid a minimum wage, or they can enter the informal economy and receive
the average income in that sector. Potential migrants are uncertain as to
which type of job they will be able to get, and therefore weigh wages in each
sector by the probability of ﬁnding a job in that sector.
Both the government and private ﬁrms in the formal and informal urban
sectors use unskilled labor in production. The public sector is assumed to
hire an exogenous level of unskilled workers at a ﬁxed nominal wage, whereas
the demand for unskilled labor by the formal private sector is determined by
ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization subject to the given minimum wage. In order to
avoid corner solutions, the wage rate paid to unskilled labor in the formal
urban sector is assumed to be systematically greater than the real wage rate
paid in the informal sector. Consequently, unskilled workers in the urban
area will always seek employment in the private formal sector ﬁrst, given
the assumption of complete job turnover in each period. The informal labor
market clears continuously; in addition, mobility of the unskilled labor force
between the formal and the informal sectors is taken to be imperfect and
determined by expectations on income opportunities formed on the basis of
prevailing conditions in the labor market.
The supply of unskilled labor in the urban sector grows as a result of “nat-
ural” urban population growth (given that individuals are born unskilled)
and migration of unskilled labor from the rural economy, as discussed earlier.
Moreover, some urban unskilled workers acquire skills and leave the unskilled
labor force to increase the supply of qualiﬁed labor in the formal economy.
Skilled workers are not employed in the informal economy–perhaps as a re-
sult of either a high reservation wage or “adverse signaling” considerations.
The acquisition of skills by unskilled workers takes place through an edu-
cation technology operated by the public sector. Speciﬁcally, the ﬂow of
unskilled workers who become skilled is taken to be a CES function of the
“eﬀective” number of teachers in the public sector and the government stock
of capital in education.
Wages for skilled labor in the private sector are determined on the basis of
the “monopoly union” framework, where a centralized labor union maximizes
a utility function that depends on deviations of both employment and the
consumption wage from their target levels, subject to the ﬁrm’s labor demand
17schedule. The union’s target real wage is assumed to be related positively to
skilled wages in the public sector and negatively to the skilled unemployment
rate, and the real ﬁring cost per skilled worker. The higher the ﬁring cost,
the greater the incentive for the union to reduce its wage demands, in order
to encourage ﬁrms to hire. Both the minimum wage and nominal wages in
the public sector are taken as to be fully indexed on the urban consumption
price index.
4.2 Composition of Demand and Prices
As noted above, both the informal and public sector goods are nontradables,
and both markets clear continuously. In each sector, total supply is thus equal
to gross production. Rural and private formal urban goods, by contrast, com-
pete with imported goods. For the rural, public, and informal sector goods,
aggregate demand consists of intermediate consumption and private demand
for ﬁnal consumption. Aggregate demand of the private formal good consists
of intermediate consumption, ﬁnal consumption by households and the pub-
lic sector, and private investment. Other current government spending on
goods and public investment expenditure are spent only on the private for-
mal sector good. Each category of households determines ﬁnal consumption
for each type of good so as to maximize a Stone-Geary utility function. Total
private investment consists of purchases of urban private sector goods. In
standard fashion, the ratio of imports to both categories of domestic goods
depends on the relative prices of these goods and the elasticity of substitution
between these goods, given the assumption of imperfect substitutability.
The world prices of imported and exported goods are taken to be ex-
ogenously given. The domestic currency price of these goods is obtained
by adjusting the world price by the exchange rate, with import prices also
adjusted by the tariﬀ rate. Prices of domestic sales in the rural and urban
private sectors adjust to equilibrate supply and demand. For the informal
and public sectors, where production does not compete with imports, the
domestic market price is simply equal to the gross output price. The con-
sumption price index is constructed separately for rural households and urban
(skilled and unskilled) households. They are computed as the weighted aver-
age of price changes over all consumed goods, where the weights reﬂect the
composition of spending by each group in the base period.
184.3 Proﬁts and Income
Firms’ proﬁts are deﬁned as revenue minus total labor costs. Proﬁts of urban
private sector ﬁrms account for both working capital costs and salaries paid to
both categories of workers, as well as payroll taxes on unskilled employment
and ﬁring costs for both categories of workers. Household income is based on
the return to labor (salaries), distributed proﬁts, and government transfers.
Households in both the rural sector and the informal urban economy own the
ﬁrms in which they are employed. Urban formal sector households receive
no proﬁts because skilled and unskilled workers in that sector do not own
the production units in which they are employed. Firms in the private urban
sector pay income taxes, and interest on their foreign borrowing. A portion
of their net proﬁts are retained for the purpose of ﬁnancing investment; the
remainder is transferred to capitalists and rentiers. Each category of house-
holds saves a ﬁxed fraction of its disposable income and allocates the rest to
consumption.
4.4 Investment-Savings Balance
Capital accumulation occurs only in the urban private sector. The desired
capital stock by ﬁrms in the private urban sector is determined so as to equate
the after-tax rate of return on capital, plus capital gains due to changes in the
price of capital and minus depreciation, to the opportunity cost of investment,
which (assuming the absence of “eﬀective” restrictions to capital mobility)
is here taken to be the world interest rate. Actual investment in each period
is determined by a partial adjustment process, and is given as a function of
the ratio between the desired capital stock and last period’s capital stock.
The aggregate identity between savings and investment is speciﬁed as fol-
lows. Total gross investment in physical capital measured in nominal terms is
ﬁnanced by ﬁrms’ after-tax retained earnings, total after-tax household sav-
ings, “primary” government savings (that is, before investment), and foreign
borrowing by ﬁrms and the government. In the simulations the aggregate
investment-savings identity is solved residually for total private investment.
In that sense, then, the basic model is “savings driven.”
194.5 Public Sector and the Balance of Payments
Government expenditures consist of government consumption, which only
has demand-side eﬀects, and public investment, which has both demand- and
supply-side eﬀects. Public investment consists of investment in infrastruc-
ture, education, and health. Investment in infrastructure is deﬁned as the
expenditure aﬀecting the accumulation of public infrastructure capital, which
includes public assets such as roads, power plants and railroads. Investment
in education aﬀects the stock of public education capital, which consists of
assets such as school buildings and other infrastructure aﬀecting skills acqui-
sition. In a similar fashion, investment in health adds to the stock of public
assets such as hospitals and other government infrastructure aﬀecting health.
Infrastructure and health capital aﬀect the production process in the private
sector as they both combine to produce the stock of government capital.
All value added in the production of public goods is distributed as wages.
The government ﬁscal balance is thus deﬁned as total tax revenues minus
the wage bill on school teachers, government transfers to households, total
employment subsidies to ﬁrms in the private formal sector, other real current
expenditures on goods and services, real investment spending, and interest
payments on loans from abroad. Total tax revenues consist of revenue gen-
erated by import tariﬀs, sales taxes, income taxes, and payroll taxes.
The external constraint implies that any current account surplus (or
deﬁcit) must be compensated by a net outﬂow (or inﬂow) of foreign capi-
tal, given by the sum of changes in net foreign borrowing by the government
and private ﬁrms. In the simulations reported below, we assume that public
foreign borrowing is exogenous, and that private foreign borrowing adjusts
to equilibrate the balance of payments.
5 Comparing Policy Shocks with Alternative
Linkages
Mini-IMMPA can be used to analyze a variety of policy and exogenous
shocks. To compare the performance of the three alternative approaches to
micro-macro linkages discussed above, the growth, employment and poverty
eﬀects of two types of labor market policies are examined in this section:
a cut in the minimum wage and an increase in the employment subsidy on
unskilled labor. Both experiments relate to critical policy issues in devel-
20oping countries (for details, see Agénor (2003)). As an indicator of living
standards, we consider in what follows only disposable household income per
capita.
5.1 Reduction in the Minimum Wage
The simulation results associated with a permanent 7 percent reduction in
the minimum wage are illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 for the ﬁrst 10 periods
after the shock.13 This time period is referred to below as the “adjustment
period.” Table 1 provides data on the most important macroeconomic indica-
tors, the government budget balance, and the labor market. Table 2 presents
data on consumer prices, disposable income for each household group, and
poverty and distributional indicators for the income variable, all in absolute
d e v i a t i o n sf r o mt h eb a s e l i n es o l u t i o n .T h ee x p e r i m e n ta s s u m e st h a tt h eg o v -
ernment borrows domestically to ﬁnance its deﬁcit–implying therefore (as
discussed earlier) an oﬀsetting adjustment in the investment of private ﬁrms,
in order to maintain the aggregate balance between savings and investment.
We ﬁrst comment on the general results of this simulation and then compare
more speciﬁcally the eﬀects on poverty and inequality, as measured by the
three diﬀerent methods.
T h ei m p a c te ﬀect of the reduction in the minimum wage is an increase in
the demand for unskilled labor in the private sector of almost 3.4 percent in
the ﬁrst year and approximately 7 to 9 percent in the following years. The
increase in demand is met by the existing pool of unskilled workers seeking
employment in the urban sector. As a result, the unskilled unemployment
rate drops signiﬁcantly, by 2.2 percentage points in the ﬁrst year and by more
than 8 percentage points in the following years, which reduces unemployment
for this segment of workers to almost zero. The cut in the minimum wage,
by reducing the relative cost of unskilled labor, leads to substitution among
production factors not only on impact but also over time. Because unskilled
labor has a relatively high elasticity of substitution with respect to the com-
posite factor consisting of skilled labor and physical capital, the lower cost
of that category of labor gives private ﬁrms in the formal sector an incentive
to substitute away from skilled labor and physical capital. In turn, the fall
in the demand for that category of labor puts downward pressure on skilled
13This reduction means that the minimum wage decreases from 1.23 times the poverty
line to 1.14 times the poverty line.
21wages, which drop by 5.2 percent in the ﬁrst period. On impact, labor supply
is ﬁxed in the rural sector and the informal economy, so the level of employ-
ment does not change in either sector–and neither does the level of activity
(real value added in both sectors is constant). The rise in real disposable in-
come (by 2.1 percent in the rural sector and 4 percent in the informal sector)
and real consumption of rural and informal sector households leads to higher
value added prices and higher wages in both sectors. But value added prices
go up by slightly more than wages in the second and subsequent periods,
implying a fall in the product wage in both sectors and a rise in employment.
Over time, changes in wage diﬀerentials aﬀect both rural-urban and formal-
informal migration ﬂows, and therefore the supply of labor in the various
production sectors. The expected unskilled wage in the formal economy is
constant on impact. Despite the increase in unskilled employment in the
private sector in the ﬁrst period (and thus the increase in the probability of
ﬁnding a job), the fall in the minimum wage is such that the urban expected
wage falls. Moreover, because rural sector wages rise, the expected urban-
rural wage diﬀerential (measured in proportion of the rural wage) falls by
more than 12 percentage points in the second period, with this diﬀerential
narrowing over time. As a result, the inﬂow of unskilled workers into the for-
mal sector (measured in proportion of the total formal urban labor supply)
falls by about 3.6 percent in period 2. In the following periods, except in pe-
riod 4, this inﬂow remains however slightly higher than in the baseline, given
the increased probability of ﬁnding a job. The reduction in the inﬂow of la-
bor leads to an increase in informal sector wages throughout the adjustment
period, by 3.1 percent in period 2, 3.9 percent in period 3, and so on. This
increase in the informal sector wage, coupled with the reduction in the min-
imum wage, leads to a sharp fall in period 2 in the expected formal-informal
wage diﬀerential, which tends to reduce the supply of unskilled labor in the
formal private sector (by 3.6 percent in period 2, and about 2.5 percent at
the end of the adjustment period), that is, the number of workers willing to
queue for employment in the urban private sector. This, coupled with the
sustained eﬀect of the cut in the minimum wage on labor demand, explains
the large eﬀect on unemployment.
Although the behavior of nominal wages in the rural sector reﬂects essen-
tially changes in value added prices on impact (as noted earlier), over time
it is also aﬀected by changes in labor demand and migration ﬂows. After an
initial increase in nominal wages, lower migration ﬂows to urban areas begin
to put downward pressure on rural wages, which end up falling (in nominal
22terms) by 2.9 percent in period 9 and 3.5 percent in the last period. As
also indicated earlier, the reduction in the cost of unskilled labor induces a
substitution away from skilled labor, which brings a sustained fall in skilled
wages in nominal terms (by about 4.8 percent in the long run). However, the
overall eﬀect on labor demand is not large; skilled employment in the private
formal sector falls in the long run by only about 0.4 percent. And because
the supply of skilled labor remains roughly constant throughout (public in-
vestment in education and the number of school teachers are held constant
at their baseline values), the skilled unemployment rate rises by only 0.2 per-
centage points. The reason for the small eﬀect on skilled employment is that
the direct substitution eﬀect associated with the reduction in the minimum
wage is oﬀset by a fall in the skilled wage, resulting from general equilibrium
eﬀects.
The eﬀect on aggregate output (or real GDP) is slightly positive in the
periods following the shock, at about 0.3 percent, and close to zero over the
rest of the adjustment period. Changes in real output (as measured by real
value added) are also positive in the urban informal sector and the urban
formal sector in the periods after the shock, but slightly negative at the end
of the simulation horizon. In contrast, in the rural sector, changes in real
output are positive throughout the simulation period and actually tend to
grow slightly over time, as a result of the gradual fall in rural sector wages.
On the ﬁscal side, total revenue falls by about 0.4 percentage points as
a share of GDP during the adjustment period, mostly as a result of indirect
taxes changing at a slower pace than nominal GDP. From the aggregate bal-
ance between investment and savings, given that public investment remains
essentially constant and the closure rule, private investment decreases by 7.5
percent. There is therefore a signiﬁcant “crowding out” eﬀect. In addition,
proﬁts of private ﬁrms suﬀer from lower disposable income of skilled workers,
capitalists and rentiers.
Despite relatively large changes in disposable income, overall poverty in-
dicators change relatively little during the adjustment period. This is, of
course, related to the fact that the aggregate growth and income eﬀects of
the shock are fairly limited and involve essentially a re-allocation of resources
across sectors. However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among household
groups. The proportion of poor households in rural areas increases by 1.7
percentage points, whereas the poverty gap (the average distance between in-
come and the poverty line as fraction of the poverty line) rises by 1 percentage
point. Although disposable income of capitalists and rentiers drops signiﬁ-
23cantly, and the incidence of poverty increases by 0.7 percentage point toward
t h ee n do ft h ea d j u s t m e n tp e r i o d ,t h ep o v e r t yg a pc h a n g e so n l yi nt h es h o r t
run, but is almost unaﬀected in the long run. For unskilled workers, both
measures of poverty indicate an improvement in the longer run, especially for
those workers involved in the informal sector. However, for unskilled workers
in the formal sector, poverty increases on impact–by about 0.6 percentage
point. There is therefore a potential short-run trade-oﬀ emerging between
unemployment and poverty: although the reduction in the minimum wage
lowers open unskilled unemployment in the formal sector, it also increases
poverty for that category of households.14 For skilled workers in the formal
sector, poverty tends to increase slightly, in both the short and the long run
by approximately 1 percentage point. Overall, therefore, poverty increases
in rural areas and decreases in urban areas, resulting in a slight decrease in
poverty at the economy-wide level. Changes in the income-based Gini coef-
ﬁcient indicate that income distribution is aﬀected only modestly by a cut
in the minimum wage; the degree of inequality falls by only a small amount
in the long run. This eﬀect is directly related to the sharp reduction in dis-
posable income experienced by skilled workers and capitalists and rentiers,
relative to other household groups.
L e tu sn o we x a m i n ei nm o r ed e t a i lt h ed i ﬀerences concerning the impact
on poverty and inequality as measured by the three approaches to micro-
macro linkages presented in section 3. With the simple micro-accounting
method (in which if changes in disposable income are feed into the house-
hold survey without taking into account changes in the employment structure
and thus in the size of relative groups), poverty is overestimated on impact
compared to the more elaborate approach based on reweighting techniques,
but as we can see from Table 2 this diﬀerences becomes smaller over the ad-
justment period. This holds regardless of whether we look at the headcount
ratio or the poverty gap. The diﬀerence represents between 0.10 and 0.25
percentage points, which may not seem that large; however, it is equivalent to
up to 20 percent of the total change in poverty relative to the initial period.
In terms of absolute deviations from the baseline, the discrepancy is smaller,
because the baseline projection is aﬀected by a bias in the same direction,
but, likewise, in relative terms, it is not negligible. Figure 4 traces the ab-
solute deviations from the baseline measured by the simple micro-accounting
method relative to the absolute deviations from the baseline measured by the
14See Agénor (2003b) for a more detailed discussion of unemployment-poverty trade-oﬀs.
24micro-accounting method combined with reweighting techniques, for both P0
and P1. For urban households, as well as all households put together, the
change is overestimated over the entire adjustment period. The diﬀerence
amounts to up to 9 percent for urban households (with a peak in the second
period) and to almost up to 20 percent for all households together (with a
peak at the end of the adjustment period). However, for urban households
the discrepancy is almost zero in period 10. The pattern of diﬀerences with
P0 and P1 is very similar. The decrease in inequality is also overestimated
if changes in the employment structure are not taken into account. Again,
in absolute terms the diﬀerence is not large, but given the small change in
inequality the relative diﬀerence is.
One reason why we do not observe even more pronounced diﬀerences
between the methods is due to the fact that the employment structure is not
very much aﬀected by the cut in the minimum wage. Therefore, in this case,
it does not appear to matter much whether we reweigh or not to account
for changes in the employment structure. However, this results from the fact
t h a tt h el a b o rm a r k e ts t r u c t u r ea n dt h ep a r a m e t e r st h a tw ei m p o s eo nM i n i -
IMMPA imply a fairly strong degree of segmentation between the diﬀerent
sectors of the labor market, with only limited mobility between them. The
degree of mobility from rural to urban areas, and from the urban informal
sector to the formal sector, responds only to a limited extent to changes in
relative wages, and the speed at which skills are acquired by unskilled workers
are driven by public investment in education infrastructure and the number
of teachers, neither one of which changes during the adjustment period. Were
we to use higher elasticities of migration ﬂows to relative wages, or were we
to account for the impact of changes in relative wages on the decision to
acquire skills, the model would yield much larger changes in the composition
of employment and the diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second approaches
to micro-macro linkages would be much larger.
As outlined in section 3, the Beta distribution approach poses problems if
we are interested in calculating exact levels of poverty. As indicated earlier,
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the poverty level in the base year
predicted by the Beta distribution approach and the actual, survey-based
measure. If we compare now the micro-accounting framework with the Beta
distribution approach, we can see from Table 2 that the latter indicates al-
ways the same direction of changes in P0 and P1 as the micro-accounting
framework. When aggregating the predicted group-speciﬁc distributions (as
discussed in section 3), reweighting by changes in the population shares mat-
25ters, as before. However, we can also see that the Beta distribution approach
overestimates systematically (except for capitalists and rentiers) changes in
the FGT indicators. Figure 5 shows again the relative diﬀerences with re-
spect to the micro-accounting framework combined with reweighting tech-
niques. For workers in the rural sector, the discrepancy ﬂuctuates and is
between plus-minus 50 percent, but lower in the beginning and at the end
of the adjustment period. For workers in the urban informal sector, the in-
dicated change for P1 lies systematically between 25 to 30 percent above,
whereas for unskilled workers the diﬀerence is between 100 to 250 percent
for P0 and nearly 100 percent for P1 above. For skilled workers in the urban
sector, the deviations are equivalent to up to 6 times the change indicated
by the micro-accounting plus reweighting method, but they are small for P0
in the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the adjustment period.
In addition, the Beta distribution approach appears to induce a bias con-
cerning poverty diﬀerentials between groups. Skilled workers seem to have
almost the same headcount ratio and poverty gap as unskilled workers, which
is not the case if we use the micro-accounting approach. For stronger or other
shocks, the Beta distribution approach may even induce a diﬀerent ranking
of household groups.
With the Beta distribution approach, as noted earlier, we can only mea-
sure changes in between-group inequality. Between-group inequality amounts
in our artiﬁcial survey to approximately 25 percent of total inequality, but
g i v e nt h a tw ee x p a n di n c o m e sf o re a c hh o u s e h o l dw i t hg r o u p - s p e c i ﬁcg r o w t h
rates, total within-group inequality changes only slightly and insofar as we
change the weights given to each within-group distribution. The change com-
puted by the Beta distribution method is slightly higher than that computed
by the micro-accounting method, but both are consistent when it comes to
the direction of the change.
5.2 Increase in Employment Subsidies
The simulation results associated with a permanent, doubling of the nominal
employment subsidy on unskilled labor (that is, an increase in the subsidy
rate from 5 to 10 percentage points of the nominal minimum wage) are illus-
trated in Tables 3 and 4 for the ﬁrst 10 periods after the shock, as before.
This subsidy is paid on a per worker basis. We assume that the government
changes nothing else in the tax and transfer system, implying therefore an
oﬀsetting adjustment in the investment of private ﬁrms, in order to main-
26tain the aggregate balance between savings and investment. Again, we ﬁrst
comment on the general results of this simulation and then compare more
speciﬁcally the eﬀects on poverty and inequality as they are measured by the
three diﬀerent methods.
The impact eﬀect of an increase in the employment subsidy is qualita-
tively similar to a cut in the minimum wage: by reducing the eﬀective cost
of unskilled labor, it tends to increase immediately the demand for that cat-
egory of labor–in the present case by 0.5 percent in the ﬁrst year, and by
about 2.6 percent on average during the adjustment period. The unskilled
unemployment rate drops by 0.4 percentage points in the ﬁrst year and 2.0
percentage points in the second year, and then remains at about 1.2 to 1.6
percentage points below the baseline in the long run. The reduction in the
“eﬀective” cost of unskilled labor leads ﬁrms in the private formal urban sec-
tor to substitute away from skilled labor and physical capital, leading to a
reduction in skilled wages by about 2.5 percent in nominal terms and a reduc-
tion in the price of value added in the private formal sector. In the present
case, the skilled nominal wage falls by more than the price of value added in
the private formal sector, implying a fall in the skilled product wage, which
stimulates the demand for that category of labor. Thus, the adverse impact
of the substitution eﬀect induced by the reduction in the cost of unskilled
labor on the demand for skilled labor is dampened. Overall, skilled employ-
ment falls by about 0.2 percent on impact and in the longer run, bringing
with it a concomitant increase in the skilled unemployment rate.
The (expected) urban-rural wage diﬀerential (expressed as percentage of
the rural wage) drops by 1.4 and 1.6 percentage points in the ﬁrst and second
period after the shock, then decreases to zero in period 7, and eventually
becomes positive by 0.7 percentage points in the long run. The expected
formal-informal wage diﬀerential (expressed as percentage of the informal
wage) decreases also in the ﬁrst period after the shock by 2.1 percentage
points and then adjusts to plus 0.6 percentage point in the medium and long
run. This evolution is qualitatively similar to the one described in the pre-
vious experiment, although the magnitude of the initial eﬀects are not as
large. The reason is that the increase in unskilled employment raises the
probability of ﬁnding a job in the private sector, thereby increasing the ex-
pected formal sector wage. As a result, there is an increase in the supply of
unskilled job seekers in the formal economy by slightly more than 1 percent
in the long run, which therefore mitigates the initial reduction in unemploy-
ment. However, because of the increase in the informal sector wage (itself
27due to the reduction in labor supply in the informal economy), the expected
formal-informal wage diﬀerential increases only slightly–thereby mitigating
the incentives to seek employment in the formal sector.
The overall eﬀect on aggregate real output is, again, fairly small.15 The
government budget is of course signiﬁcantly aﬀected, with indirect tax rev-
enue falling by about 0.3 percentage points of GDP. As with the reduction in
the minimum wage, private investment decreases signiﬁc a n t l y .T h i si sa g a i n
due to lower proﬁts resulting from lower disposable income of skilled workers,
as well as capitalists and rentiers, and the crowding-out eﬀect resulting from
the higher government deﬁcit.
In the short run the drop in poverty of rural households and urban un-
skilled households in the informal and formal sectors is quite signiﬁcant. In
the long run, however, poverty decreases only slightly for urban informal
and formal unskilled workers, and even increases in the rural sector (despite
the small increase in employment) as well as for urban skilled workers, and
capitalist and rentiers. These eﬀects are qualitatively very similar to those
observed for the cut in the minimum wage, but much smaller in magnitude.
As with the cut in the minimum wage, inequality of the distribution of dis-
posable income decreases, but less than in the previous simulation. At the
end of the adjustment period the diﬀerence to the baseline is even close to
zero.
To what extent do these results depend on the method used to link the
micro with the macro level? As before, the simple micro-accounting method
overstates P0 and P1 with respect to the second method, which combines
micro-accounting with reweighting (see Table 4). Again, because changes in
the employment structure following the shock are small, the absolute dif-
ferences are also small, lying between 0.12 and 0.25 percentage points. In
relative terms, however, this corresponds to diﬀerences of between 15 to al-
most 100 percent of the total change occurring between periods 1 and 10.
Figure 6 shows again the absolute deviations from the baseline measured
by the simple micro-accounting method relative to the absolute deviations
from the baseline measured by the micro-accounting method combined with
reweighting techniques. For both poverty indicators, P0 and P1,a n df o ru r -
15An important feature of the long-run adjustment process, however, is a slight reduction
in the size of the urban informal and formal sectors, and an expansion of the rual sector.
This result is therefore consistent with the widely-held view that reducing the tax burden
(or paying a subsidy) on the formal sector is essential to limit the growth of the informal
sector.
28ban households and all households together, the change with respect to the
baseline is overestimated in the short run (by approximately 5 percent) and
underestimated in the long run (also by approximately 5 percent). If the
household survey is not reweighted, the decrease in inequality is slightly un-
derestimated; the diﬀerence between the two approaches is again very small
in absolute terms but large in relative terms.
If we compare the micro-accounting framework with the Beta distribution
approach, our results again show that the latter indicates always the same
direction of changes in P0 and P1 as the former (except for P1 in period 1
for unskilled workers in the urban formal sector). Figure 7 shows that for
workers in the rural sector the Beta distribution approach indicates for P0
and P1 in the short term a much higher change, and then in the medium
term a much lower change, with respect to the baseline. However, at the
end of the adjustment period both methods lead almost to the same change.
For unskilled workers in the urban informal sector, changes in P0 and P1
are overestimated, for P0 in the long run by more than 30 percent, and for
P1 by 20 to 30 percent throughout the adjustment period. For unskilled
workers in the urban formal sector, the change of P0 ﬂuctuates around the
change indicated by the micro-accounting framework and amounts in some
periods to more than 300 percent of the latter. The indicated direction of
the change of P1 is on impact even the opposite of that indicated by the
micro-accounting method; it goes afterward in the correct direction, but it
overestimates continuously by almost 100 percent. For skilled workers in
the urban formal sector, changes in both poverty indicators as measured
b yt h eB e t ad i s t r i b u t i o nm e t h o da r em o r et h a n2t o1 0t i m e sh i g h e rt h a n
those measured by the micro-accounting method, but the deviations decrease
over time. For capitalists and rentiers, the micro-accounting method shows
as l i g h ti n c r e a s eo fP0 and P1, except through periods 6 to 8, the Beta
distribution approach shows no change at all after the second period.
Both experiments, the cut in the minimum wage and the increase in
the employment subsidy, lead to qualitatively similar results. A low impact
on aggregate output, an increase of rural poverty and a decrease of urban
poverty. In rural areas the increase in labor supply, resulting from lower
incentives to migrate to urban areas, puts pressure on wages. In urban areas
lower unemployment leads to less poverty. In sum, both policies result in
a slight decrease of poverty on the economy wide level. These changes are
indicated in a qualitative, but not in magnitude, similar way by the three
macro-micro linkages we compared.
296C o n c l u s i o n s
The purpose of this study was to compare three approaches to model linkages
between a macroeconomic model with representative households and micro
household income data to evaluate the distributional and poverty eﬀects of
poverty reduction strategies and other exogenous shocks. The three methods
were evaluated by performing a set of simulations with Mini-IMMPA, a dis-
aggregated dynamic computable general equilibrium model that can readily
be linked to a household survey, and two typical labor market policies: a cut
in the minimum wage and an increase in employment subsidies for unskilled
labor. The results of these simulations were discussed and the three methods
compared.
The distributional and poverty eﬀects indicated by the three approaches
are not fundamentally diﬀerent, they diﬀer neither in the direction of the
eﬀects nor in the ranking of the household categories with respect to poverty.
However, from both a conceptual and practical point of view, it is tempting to
view the micro-accounting method combined with reweighting for changes in
the employment structure as constituting the most appealing method among
the three, despite the fact that it has its own shortcomings. The reason is
that the simple micro-accounting method ignores changes in the employment
structure, whereas the distribution approach relies on approximate, instead
of real, income distributions and depends therefore on the quality of the
corresponding estimates of the shape parameters.
Our results indicate that the two other methods, and especially the Beta
distribution approach, induce signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning the magni-
tude of poverty changes. In addition, as noted earlier, the distribution ap-
proach may not be adapted if one is interested in the exact level of poverty
and not only in changes relative to the baseline. Of course, the problem
of predicting the initial levels might partly be due to the fact that we try
to model with Beta distributions our artiﬁcial household data generated by
log-normal distributions. The Beta distribution approach might work better
with real household data. However, the nonparametric method, that is, the
extended micro-accounting framework, can readily be used with actual sur-
vey data. Given the performance of standard micro-computers and statistical
software nowadays, there is really no need to use the distribution approach,
except perhaps for very large household surveys. However, economists who
advocate this approach suggest using it if the sample of households is small,
because then the ﬁtted distribution is smooth even if the observed one is not.
30The smoothing thus avoids, so goes the argument, the possibility that small
shifts in the income distribution would lead to huge changes in the poverty
measure. The problem with this argument is that the estimated distribution
parameters, as Table A2 indicates, are not very reliable if they are estimated
over a small sample of households (compare the observed and ﬁtted poverty
measures for the group of skilled workers in the formal urban sector and
of capitalists-rentiers). Therefore the parametric approach runs the risk of
producing biased results.
The potential errors when using the simple micro-accounting framework
o rt h ed i s t r i b u t i o nf r a m e w o r ka r eo fc o u r s em u c hm o r ei m p o r t a n ti fp o l i c i e s
with strong eﬀects on the employment structure and the group-speciﬁci n -
come levels are analyzed. For instance, if the minimum wage was reduced
by 50 percent in our model, then the employment structure would change
dramatically. The share of rural workers would be divided by two, the share
of informal workers would increase by 25 percent and the share of formal un-
skilled workers would double. Poverty indicators calculated by both methods
would diﬀer by more than 10 percentage points whether these changes are
taken into account or not. Other policies that form part of poverty reduc-
tion strategies, such as changes in the composition of public investment for
instance, might in the long run also be connected with important variations
in the composition of employment. Alternatively, as noted earlier, changes
in the employment structure would be a lot larger than those obtained in
our experiments if migration ﬂows responded more rapidly and signiﬁcantly
to changes in relative wages.
As mentioned above, the micro-accounting framework combined with
reweighting for changes in the employment structure also has shortcomings.
First, one might think, especially when conducting dynamic analyses, of ex-
tending this framework by reweighting for changes in other dimensions of the
population structure (for instance, age structure, household size, gender) as
well. This issue will be addressed in future work. Then, a further step in
taking into account individual and household heterogeneity and to allow the
intra-group distributions to vary explicitly would imply reliance on a micro-
simulation model that accounts for labor supply decisions and earnings at
the level of the household, or better, the individual. The diﬀerence with
the reweighting approach is that then we would not change the weights of
individuals, but we would shift them from one sector to another using be-
31havioral functions econometrically estimated.16 However, the drawback of
this type of modelling is that the use of a microeconomic model of income
generation needs for econometric estimation as well as simulation a power-
ful statistical data analyzing software package (beside the software usually
used to solve Macro-RHG models) and may therefore be more diﬃcult to
standardize. By contrast, the micro-accounting framework combined with
reweighting for changes in the employment structure preserves a high degree
of user-friendliness, which may help its eventual adoption by researchers and
policy advisers in developing countries.
16Existing examples in the ﬁeld of poverty analysis include Cogneau (2001), Cogneau
and Robilliard (2001), Cockburn (2001), Robilliard, Bourguignon, and Robinson (2001),
Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson (2002), Grimm (2002), and Cogneau and Grimm
(2002). In general, the application of micro-simulation techniques to developing countries
is rather new and raises a number of speciﬁc problems, as discussed by Bourguignon,
Pereira da Silva, and Stern (2002) and Cogneau, Grimm, and Robilliard (2003).
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35Appendix A
Reweighting when using Real Survey Data
In a speciﬁc country application it might be necessary, in a ﬁrst step, to ensure
consistency between the Macro-RHG model and the household survey data in
t h eb a s ey e a r . 17 Computed macro aggregates, such as household production,
income, or consumption, from household survey data almost never match
published national accounts data even though sample weights are designed
to represent the national population. I np a r t i c u l a r ,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a tt h e
composition of employment, output, and the inter-group income distribution
generated by the Macro-RHG model and the household survey are diﬀerent.
Many reasons are oﬀered to explain this mismatch. On the household survey
side, there may be sampling errors due to inadequate survey design and/or
measurement errors, because it is diﬃcult to get accurate responses from
households concerning economic variables. On the national accounts side,
while supply-side information on output and income for some sectors is based
on high-quality survey or census data for agriculture and industry, informa-
tion for subsistence farmers and informal producers is harder to obtain and
usually of lower quality. However, there are also good reasons why household
data and national accounts data for some variables do not match. For in-
stance, consumption in national accounts is typically determined as a residual
and is thus contaminated by errors and omissions elsewhere in the accounts.
In other words, the concept of national accounts data and household survey
data is not the same for some variables. In practice, researchers often end up
treating one source or the other as the “correct” or “most reliable”–despite
t h ef a c tt h a ti ti sl i k e l yt h a tb o t hs o u r c es of information are subject to errors.
Another issue when working with real household data is that it may be im-
portant to account for, besides changes in the employment structure (which
includes region of residence, education, and sector of activity), other policy
target variables as well. Most poverty proﬁles show that age of the household
head, sex of the household head as well as household size are very impor-
tant variables in this respect. Changes in the population structure are of
course particularly important when the Macro-RHG model is dynamic. The
information about these additional changes may come either directly from
the Macro-RHG model or taken from external sources such as the United
Nations’ demographic projections for age structure.
17See Robilliard and Robinson (1999) for instance, who reconcile a Malagasy household
survey and national accounts data.
36In this case, if the reweighting procedure includes more than one dimen-
sion of the population structure and if constraints are put on the moments of
some variables then this procedure becomes slightly more diﬃcult. In general
reweighting can be done in two ways: either by the simple matching of ma-
trices constructed for the reference data and the data that has to be adjusted
(see for instance Landt et al. (1994)) or by the explicit use of minimum dis-
tance functions, which calculate weights such that they match certain criteria
with respect to the distance between the initial and the adjusted distribution
of weights (see for instance Merz (1994)).
37Appendix B
Estimated Shape Parameters and Fitted Poverty
Measures with Beta Distribution Functions
Table A1
Parameters for the beta density distribution function
Moments estimates
RU UI UU US KAP
Household Consumption Expenditure Per Capita
¯ y 0.080 0.097 0.122 0.229 0.306
min(y) 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.035 0.076
max(y) 0.454 0.680 0.699 1.089 0.932
¯ x 0.164 0.132 0.159 0.184 0.269
s2 0.025 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.047
ˆ β1 0.739 0.731 0.710 0.944 0.855
ˆ β2 3.768 4.799 3.759 4.192 2.323
Disposable Household Income Per Capita
¯ c 0.089 0.111 0.134 0.280 0.426
min(c) 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.045 0.071
max(c) 0.625 0.880 0.612 1.228 1.175
¯ x 0.134 0.117 0.203 0.199 0.321
s2 0.017 0.013 0.032 0.028 0.058
ˆ β1 0.753 0.818 0.820 0.936 0.880
ˆ β2 4.881 6.188 3.230 3.776 1.858
Sample size 1397 2253 674 486 140
Notes: ‘RU’ stands for workers in the agricultural sector (rural), ‘UI’ for workers in the informal urban
sector, ‘UU’ for unskilled workers in the formal urban sector, ‘US’ for skilled workers in the formal urban
sector, and ‘KAP’ for capitalists-rentiers.
Source: Estimations by the authors.
38Table A2
Observed and ﬁtted poverty measures
using the estimated shape parameters of the Beta distribution,
without (nco) and with correction of outliers (co)
Head count ratio Gap ratio
Obs. Fit. (nco) Fit. (co) Obs. Fit. (nco) Fit. (co)
Disposable Household Income Per Capita
RU 50.04 50.90 49.09 20.57 30.90 29.20
UI 43.35 51.59 45.66 17.41 31.69 26.57
UU 32.16 37.89 36.48 13.03 21.39 20.62
US 4.44 14.88 9.60 1.15 7.50 4.99
KAP 3.33 4.66 0.00 0.40 2.44 0.00
Household Consumption Expenditure Per Capita
RU 50.11 50.82 49.38 20.77 29.72 29.66
UI 46.40 48.40 48.32 19.31 28.34 29.01
UU 37.72 47.45 40.31 13.89 29.83 24.32
US 8.27 18.73 12.93 2.02 9.58 6.65
KAP 2.00 8.59 0.00 0.45 4.41 0.00
Notes: ‘RU’ stands for workers in the agricultural sector (rural), ‘UI’ for workers in the informal urban
sector, ‘UU’ for unskilled workers in the formal urban sector, ‘US’ for skilled workers in the formal urban
sector, and ‘KAP’ for capitalists-rentiers.
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Macroeconomic Indicators
GDP at market prices -0,1 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1
Value added at factor cost 0,2 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1
   Value added in rural sector 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,3 1,4 1,5
   Value added in urban informal sector 0,0 0,7 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4
   Value added in urban formal sector 0,5 1,0 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,0 -0,1
Private Consumption 0,5 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,6
Private Investment -10,7 -5,9 -7,2 -7,1 -7,2 -7,3 -7,4 -7,5 -7,5 -7,5
Disposable income 0,4 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5
Government Budget Balance (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue -0,7 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4
    Direct taxes -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1
    Indirect taxes -0,5 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
Total expenditure -0,1 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
    Consumption 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Investment -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0
    Transfers to households 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Foreign interest payments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total financing 0,5 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
    Foreign financing 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Domestic borrowing 0,5 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
Labor Market
Nominal wages
    Agricultural sector 3,7 3,9 2,3 1,3 0,3 -0,6 -1,4 -2,2 -2,9 -3,5
    Informal sector 5,4 3,1 3,9 4,0 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6 4,7
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0 -7,0
        Skilled  -5,2 -3,8 -4,3 -4,3 -4,4 -4,5 -4,6 -4,7 -4,8 -4,8
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
        Skilled  0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Employment
    Agricultural sector 0,0 0,3 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,7 1,8
    Informal sector 0,0 0,9 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,0 -0,1 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled 3,4 7,6 7,0 7,5 7,8 8,1 8,4 8,8 9,1 9,4
        Skilled  -0,5 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
        Skilled  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Labor supply (urban formal sector)
    Unskilled 0,0 -3,6 -2,9 -3,0 -3,0 -2,9 -2,8 -2,7 -2,5 -2,4
    Skilled  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Unemployment rate (urban formal sector) 
1
    Unskilled -2,2 -8,6 -7,4 -7,9 -8,0 -8,2 -8,3 -8,4 -8,4 -8,5
    Skilled  0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Real wage differentials 
1
    Expected urban-rural (% of rural wage) 0,0 -12,7 -14,7 -12,5 -11,3 -10,0 -8,9 -7,9 -6,9 -6,0
    Expected formal-informal (% of informal wage) 0,0 -9,5 2,1 -0,5 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4
Migration 
1
    Rural-urban (% of urban labor supply) 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0
    Formal-informal (% of formal urban labor supply) 0,0 -3,6 0,8 -0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2
1 Absolute deviation from base line  
2 real terms
Table 1
7 Percent Cut in Unskilled Labor Minimum Wage





Rural CPI 1,31 1,09 0,94 0,79 0,65 0,52 0,40 0,28 0,18 0,08
Urban CPI 0,74 0,54 0,55 0,51 0,48 0,45 0,42 0,39 0,36 0,34
Cum. Growth of Real Disposable Income 
1
Rural households 2,08 2,76 1,77 1,20 0,60 0,07 -0,43 -0,89 -1,31 -1,69
Urban households 0,01 0,35 0,43 0,56 0,66 0,76 0,86 0,94 1,03 1,10
   Informal 4,03 2,98 3,37 3,42 3,50 3,55 3,59 3,61 3,61 3,61
   Formal unskilled -2,55 -0,36 -0,65 -0,38 -0,23 -0,04 0,14 0,32 0,49 0,67
   Formal skilled -2,55 -1,90 -2,12 -2,15 -2,21 -2,26 -2,31 -2,35 -2,39 -2,43
   Capitalists and rentiers -6,09 -3,81 -3,88 -3,43 -3,08 -2,71 -2,34 -1,98 -1,62 -1,26
Household Shares
Rural households 0,00 0,07 0,15 0,22 0,29 0,34 0,39 0,44 0,47 0,51
Urban households 0,00 -0,07 -0,15 -0,22 -0,29 -0,34 -0,39 -0,44 -0,47 -0,51
   Informal 0,00 0,39 0,21 0,16 0,08 0,01 -0,05 -0,11 -0,17 -0,22
   Formal unskilled 0,00 -0,47 -0,36 -0,38 -0,37 -0,36 -0,34 -0,32 -0,30 -0,28
   Formal skilled 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
   Capitalists and rentiers 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Poverty and Distributional Indicators (Income-based)
Poverty Line 
1
   Rural 1,31 1,09 0,94 0,79 0,65 0,52 0,40 0,28 0,18 0,08
   Urban 0,75 0,55 0,55 0,51 0,48 0,45 0,42 0,39 0,37 0,34
Micro-accounting approach with and without reweighting
Poverty Headcount
   Rural households -1,14 -1,14 -0,64 -0,28 0,21 0,64 1,14 1,42 1,49 1,71
   Urban households (without reweighting) -1,34 -0,92 -1,17 -1,17 -1,28 -1,34 -1,34 -1,25 -1,22 -1,28
   Urban households (with reweighting) -1,34 -0,84 -1,14 -1,14 -1,26 -1,32 -1,32 -1,23 -1,22 -1,29
      Informal -2,61 -1,55 -1,86 -1,94 -1,99 -2,08 -2,12 -2,17 -2,17 -2,12
      Formal unskilled 0,58 -0,88 -0,44 -0,44 -0,58 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,58 -0,58
      Formal skilled 1,01 1,21 0,20 0,60 0,20 0,60 0,81 1,81 1,61 1,01
      Capitalists and rentiers 1,33 1,33 1,33 1,33 1,33 0,67 0,67 0,00 0,67 0,67
    Economy (without reweighting) -1,28 -0,98 -1,02 -0,92 -0,86 -0,78 -0,64 -0,50 -0,46 -0,44
    Economy (with reweighting) -1,29 -0,92 -0,98 -0,87 -0,81 -0,72 -0,58 -0,42 -0,39 -0,37
Poverty Gap
   Rural households -0,60 -0,71 -0,35 -0,11 0,12 0,34 0,54 0,72 0,88 1,03
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,59 -0,50 -0,58 -0,62 -0,66 -0,69 -0,72 -0,74 -0,75 -0,77
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,60 -0,47 -0,57 -0,60 -0,65 -0,68 -0,71 -0,73 -0,75 -0,77
      Informal -1,15 -0,64 -0,84 -0,87 -0,93 -0,97 -1,01 -1,05 -1,07 -1,09
      Formal unskilled 0,54 -0,61 -0,41 -0,49 -0,51 -0,54 -0,55 -0,57 -0,58 -0,58
      Formal skilled 0,14 0,12 0,15 0,15 0,16 0,16 0,18 0,19 0,22 0,24
      Capitalists and rentiers 0,23 0,14 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,05 0,04
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,59 -0,56 -0,52 -0,48 -0,44 -0,40 -0,36 -0,33 -0,29 -0,26
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,60 -0,53 -0,50 -0,45 -0,41 -0,37 -0,34 -0,30 -0,26 -0,23
Overall Inequality 
   Gini-coefficient (without reweighting) -0,0074 -0,0053 -0,0052 -0,0046 -0,0041 -0,0036 -0,0031 -0,0026 -0,0022 -0,0018
   Gini-coefficient (with reweighting) -0,0075 -0,0053 -0,0051 -0,0045 -0,0040 -0,0035 -0,0031 -0,0026 -0,0022 -0,0018
   Theil-index (without reweighting) -0,0153 -0,0116 -0,0111 -0,0099 -0,0089 -0,0079 -0,0069 -0,0059 -0,0050 -0,0041
   Theil-index (with reweighting) -0,0155 -0,0113 -0,0109 -0,0097 -0,0087 -0,0076 -0,0066 -0,0057 -0,0048 -0,0039
Beta-distribution approach with and without reweighting
Poverty Headcount
   Rural households -1,18 -1,36 -0,72 -0,30 0,12 0,50 0,84 1,16 1,44 1,70
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,87 -0,97 -1,10 -1,22 -1,30 -1,37 -1,42 -1,46 -1,49 -1,51
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,88 -0,88 -1,05 -1,17 -1,25 -1,32 -1,37 -1,42 -1,45 -1,48
      Informal -2,41 -1,31 -1,71 -1,77 -1,87 -1,95 -2,02 -2,07 -2,11 -2,15
      Formal unskilled 1,33 -1,91 -1,29 -1,53 -1,57 -1,62 -1,66 -1,68 -1,69 -1,69
      Formal skilled 1,70 1,22 1,30 1,27 1,25 1,24 1,22 1,20 1,19 1,17
      Capitalists and rentiers 3,82 1,37 1,09 0,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,96 -1,08 -0,99 -0,96 -0,90 -0,84 -0,78 -0,72 -0,66 -0,61
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,96 -1,01 -0,94 -0,90 -0,84 -0,78 -0,72 -0,66 -0,60 -0,54
Poverty Gap
   Rural households -0,76 -0,87 -0,46 -0,19 0,08 0,32 0,54 0,75 0,93 1,09
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,60 -0,62 -0,71 -0,78 -0,83 -0,87 -0,90 -0,92 -0,94 -0,96
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,61 -0,57 -0,68 -0,74 -0,80 -0,84 -0,87 -0,90 -0,92 -0,94
      Informal -1,52 -0,83 -1,08 -1,12 -1,18 -1,23 -1,28 -1,31 -1,34 -1,36
      Formal unskilled 0,79 -1,13 -0,77 -0,91 -0,93 -0,97 -0,99 -1,00 -1,01 -1,01
      Formal skilled 0,91 0,66 0,71 0,69 0,68 0,68 0,67 0,66 0,66 0,65
      Capitalists and rentiers 1,99 0,71 0,57 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,64 -0,69 -0,64 -0,61 -0,57 -0,53 -0,49 -0,45 -0,42 -0,38
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,65 -0,65 -0,61 -0,58 -0,54 -0,49 -0,45 -0,41 -0,38 -0,34
Between-group Inequality
   Theil-index (without reweighting) -0,0173 -0,0127 -0,0124 -0,0111 -0,0100 -0,0089 -0,0078 -0,0068 -0,0058 -0,0048
   Theil-index (with reweighting) -0,0174 -0,0127 -0,0124 -0,0110 -0,0099 -0,0088 -0,0078 -0,0068 -0,0058 -0,0048
1 Percentage deviations from the base line  
2 Gini Coefficients and Theil Indices measure between-group inequality
Periods
Table 2
Mini-IMMPA: Price, Poverty and Distributional Indicators
7 Percent Cut in Unskilled Labor Minimum Wage
(In absolute deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
42123456789 1 0
Macroeconomic Indicators
GDP at market prices -0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
Value added at factor cost 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3
   Value added in rural sector 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
   Value added in urban informal sector 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3
   Value added in urban formal sector 0,1 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 -0,5
Private Consumption 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Private Investment -6,0 -4,5 -4,8 -4,6 -4,5 -4,4 -4,4 -4,3 -4,2 -4,1
Disposable income 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1
Government Budget Balance (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
    Direct taxes -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Indirect taxes -0,4 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
Total expenditure 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
    Consumption 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Investment -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Transfers to households 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Foreign interest payments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total financing 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
    Foreign financing 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Domestic borrowing 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
Labor Market
Nominal wages
    Agricultural sector 1,6 1,6 1,1 0,8 0,5 0,3 0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,4
    Informal sector 2,5 1,8 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,4
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
        Skilled  -2,5 -2,1 -2,3 -2,3 -2,4 -2,4 -2,5 -2,5 -2,5 -2,5
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
        Skilled  0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Employment
    Agricultural sector 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
    Informal sector 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,3
    Private formal sector
        Unskilled 0,5 1,9 1,9 2,2 2,4 2,7 2,9 3,1 3,3 3,5
        Skilled  -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2
    Public sector
        Unskilled 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
        Skilled  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Labor supply (urban formal sector)
    Unskilled 0,0 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,7 1,0 1,2
    Skilled  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Unemployment rate (urban formal sector) 
1
    Unskilled -0,4 -2,0 -1,5 -1,6 -1,5 -1,5 -1,4 -1,3 -1,3 -1,2
    Skilled  0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Real wage differentials 
1
    Expected urban-rural (% of rural wage) 0,0 -1,4 -1,6 -1,0 -0,6 -0,3 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,7
    Expected formal-informal (% of informal wage) 0,0 -2,1 1,2 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5
Migration 
1
    Rural-urban (% of urban labor supply) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Formal-informal (% of formal urban labor supply) 0,0 -0,8 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
1 Absolute deviation from base line  
2 real terms
Table 3
100 Percent Increase (from 5 to 10 percent of the min. wage) in Employment Subsidy on Unskilled Labor





Rural CPI 0,59 0,50 0,44 0,38 0,32 0,27 0,22 0,18 0,15 0,12
Urban CPI 0,34 0,27 0,25 0,23 0,21 0,19 0,17 0,15 0,14 0,12
Cum. Growth of Real Disposable Income 
1
Rural households 0,88 0,99 0,66 0,46 0,26 0,09 -0,06 -0,19 -0,30 -0,40
Urban households 0,19 0,26 0,26 0,27 0,27 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,27
   Informal 1,91 1,48 1,48 1,37 1,28 1,20 1,11 1,02 0,94 0,86
   Formal unskilled 0,03 0,78 0,80 0,98 1,11 1,25 1,38 1,50 1,62 1,73
   Formal skilled -1,22 -1,05 -1,13 -1,15 -1,17 -1,19 -1,21 -1,23 -1,24 -1,25
   Capitalists and rentiers -2,92 -2,14 -2,05 -1,81 -1,62 -1,42 -1,24 -1,07 -0,91 -0,75
Household Shares
Rural households 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02
Urban households 0,00 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02
   Informal 0,00 0,09 0,02 0,00 -0,04 -0,06 -0,09 -0,11 -0,13 -0,15
   Formal unskilled 0,00 -0,10 -0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,09 0,11 0,13
   Formal skilled 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
   Capitalists and rentiers 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Poverty and Distributional Indicators (Income-based)
Poverty Line 
1
   Rural 0,59 0,50 0,44 0,38 0,32 0,27 0,22 0,18 0,15 0,12
   Urban 0,34 0,27 0,26 0,23 0,21 0,19 0,17 0,15 0,14 0,12
Micro-accounting approach with and without reweighting
Poverty Headcount
   Rural households -0,50 -0,50 -0,28 -0,21 -0,14 0,00 0,14 0,21 0,21 0,21
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,70 -0,45 -0,47 -0,39 -0,42 -0,47 -0,47 -0,25 -0,25 -0,17
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,70 -0,42 -0,47 -0,39 -0,42 -0,48 -0,49 -0,26 -0,26 -0,18
      Informal -1,24 -0,75 -0,80 -0,75 -0,71 -0,66 -0,66 -0,62 -0,57 -0,44
      Formal unskilled 0,00 -0,44 -0,15 0,00 -0,15 -0,29 -0,29 0,00 -0,15 -0,15
      Formal skilled 0,20 0,60 0,20 0,40 0,20 0,00 0,00 1,01 0,81 0,81
      Capitalists and rentiers 1,33 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,67 0,67
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,64 -0,46 -0,42 -0,34 -0,34 -0,34 -0,30 -0,12 -0,12 -0,06
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,64 -0,44 -0,41 -0,34 -0,34 -0,34 -0,31 -0,12 -0,12 -0,07
Poverty Gap
   Rural households -0,26 -0,28 -0,17 -0,11 -0,05 0,00 0,04 0,08 0,11 0,14
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,34 -0,28 -0,29 -0,28 -0,27 -0,26 -0,25 -0,24 -0,23 -0,21
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,34 -0,28 -0,29 -0,28 -0,27 -0,26 -0,25 -0,24 -0,23 -0,22
      Informal -0,56 -0,38 -0,42 -0,40 -0,40 -0,38 -0,37 -0,36 -0,35 -0,34
      Formal unskilled 0,01 -0,29 -0,20 -0,20 -0,19 -0,17 -0,15 -0,14 -0,12 -0,10
      Formal skilled 0,06 0,06 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,12
      Capitalists and rentiers 0,10 0,07 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,31 -0,28 -0,26 -0,23 -0,21 -0,19 -0,17 -0,15 -0,13 -0,12
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,31 -0,28 -0,25 -0,23 -0,21 -0,19 -0,17 -0,15 -0,14 -0,12
Overall Inequality 
   Gini-coefficient (without reweighting) -0,0036 -0,0028 -0,0027 -0,0024 -0,0022 -0,0019 -0,0017 -0,0016 -0,0014 -0,0012
   Gini-coefficient (with reweighting) -0,0036 -0,0028 -0,0027 -0,0024 -0,0022 -0,0020 -0,0018 -0,0016 -0,0015 -0,0013
   Theil-index (without reweighting) -0,0076 -0,0062 -0,0058 -0,0052 -0,0047 -0,0042 -0,0037 -0,0033 -0,0029 -0,0026
   Theil-index (with reweighting) -0,0077 -0,0061 -0,0058 -0,0052 -0,0048 -0,0043 -0,0039 -0,0035 -0,0031 -0,0028
Beta-distribution approach with and without reweighting
Poverty Headcount
   Rural households -0,50 -0,53 -0,35 -0,24 -0,13 -0,03 0,05 0,11 0,17 0,22
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,56 -0,55 -0,54 -0,52 -0,50 -0,48 -0,45 -0,42 -0,40 -0,37
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,56 -0,53 -0,53 -0,51 -0,49 -0,47 -0,45 -0,42 -0,40 -0,38
      Informal -1,12 -0,76 -0,82 -0,79 -0,77 -0,74 -0,72 -0,69 -0,66 -0,63
      Formal unskilled -0,05 -0,88 -0,63 -0,63 -0,56 -0,51 -0,46 -0,41 -0,36 -0,30
      Formal skilled 0,82 0,67 0,69 0,68 0,67 0,66 0,65 0,63 0,62 0,61
      Capitalists and rentiers 0,82 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,55 -0,55 -0,49 -0,44 -0,39 -0,35 -0,31 -0,27 -0,24 -0,21
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,54 -0,53 -0,48 -0,43 -0,39 -0,35 -0,31 -0,27 -0,24 -0,21
Poverty Gap
   Rural households -0,32 -0,34 -0,22 -0,15 -0,08 -0,02 0,03 0,07 0,11 0,14
   Urban households (without reweighting) -0,37 -0,35 -0,35 -0,33 -0,32 -0,31 -0,29 -0,27 -0,26 -0,24
   Urban households (with reweighting) -0,37 -0,34 -0,34 -0,33 -0,32 -0,30 -0,29 -0,28 -0,26 -0,25
      Informal -0,71 -0,48 -0,52 -0,50 -0,49 -0,47 -0,46 -0,44 -0,42 -0,40
      Formal unskilled -0,03 -0,52 -0,37 -0,37 -0,34 -0,31 -0,28 -0,24 -0,21 -0,18
      Formal skilled 0,44 0,36 0,38 0,37 0,36 0,36 0,35 0,35 0,34 0,34
      Capitalists and rentiers 0,43 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
    Economy (without reweighting) -0,36 -0,35 -0,31 -0,28 -0,25 -0,23 -0,20 -0,18 -0,15 -0,13
    Economy (with reweighting) -0,36 -0,34 -0,31 -0,28 -0,25 -0,22 -0,20 -0,18 -0,16 -0,14
Between-group Inequality
   Theil-index (without reweighting) -0,0085 -0,0068 -0,0064 -0,0058 -0,0052 -0,0047 -0,0042 -0,0038 -0,0033 -0,0029
   Theil-index (with reweighting) -0,0086 -0,0068 -0,0065 -0,0058 -0,0053 -0,0048 -0,0043 -0,0039 -0,0035 -0,0031
1 Percentage deviations from the base line  
2 Gini Coefficients and Theil Indices measure between-group inequality
Periods
Table 4
Mini-IMMPA: Price, Poverty and Distributional Indicators
100 Percent Increase (from 5 to 10 percent of the min. wage) in Employment Subsidy on Unskilled Labor
(In absolute deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)
44Figure 4 
Comparison of the poverty impact measured by the simple micro-accounting method relative to that 
measured by the micro-accounting method combinded with reweighting techniques 
(Ratio of absolute deviations from baseline) 
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Comparison of the poverty impact measured by the the BETA distribution method relative to that 
measured by the micro-accounting method combinded with reweighting techniques 
(Ratio of absolute deviations from baseline) 
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Workers in the informal urban sector
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Unskilled workers in the formal urban sector
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Skilled workers in the formal urban sector
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 45Figure 6 
Comparison of the poverty impact measured by the simple micro-accounting method relative to that 
measured by the micro-accounting method combinded with reweighting techniques 
(Ratio of absolute deviations from baseline) 
 













Comparison of the poverty impact measured by the the BETA distribution method relative to that 
measured by the micro-accounting method combinded with reweighting techniques 
(Ratio of absolute deviations from baseline) 
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Unskilled workers in the formal urban sector
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Workers in the informal urban sector
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Skilled workers in the formal urban sector
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 Figure A1 
Observed and by a Beta-distribution fitted cumulative distribution function 
of normalized disposable income for each category of households 





































Norm. Income - Workers in the Agricultural Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Income - Unskilled Workers in the Form. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Income - Workers in the Inform. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Income - Skilled Workers in the Form. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted















































Norm. Income - Capitalists and Rentiers
 Observed  Fitted













 47Figure A2 
Observed and by a Beta-distribution fitted cumulative distribution function 
of normalized consumption for each category of households 





































Norm. Consumption - Workers in the Agricultural Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Consumption - Unskilled Workers in the Form. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted















































Norm. Consumption - Workers in the Inform. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Consumption - Skilled Workers in the Form. Urban Sector
 Observed  Fitted
















































Norm. Consumption - Capitalists and Rentiers
 Observed  Fitted
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